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FINALITY AND FAIR REPRESENTATION:
GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION IS NOT FINAL IF THE
UNION HAS BREACHED ITS DUTY OF FAIR
REPRESENTATION.
In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,' the Supreme Court held that
the Finality Rule, 2 according presumptive validity to an arbitration
award, is not applicable if an employee can establish that his union
breached its duty of fair representation.3 The Finality Rule is a mani-
festation of the public policy favoring internal settlement of labor
grievances.4 By establishing an exception to this rule conditioned
upon proving a breach of the duty of fair representation, the Court
evinced its recognition of the importance of balancing individual
rights against collective interests in labor grievance administration.
However, the Court's discussion of the fair representation standard
5
threatens to limit the reach of that exception to the Finality Rule
created by Hines.'
The Finality Rule follows from the fundamental labor law princi-
ple that industrial disputes are best resolved through mechanisms of
the parties' choosing. 7 This basic policy has been implemented by
according presumptive validity to decisions reached through collec-
tive bargaining grievance mechanisms.8 The Supreme Court
1 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
2 The Supreme Court established the Finality Rule with its decisions in the
Steelworkers Trilogy. See text accompanying notes 9-11 infra.
The duty of fair representation has received varied treatment from the federal
courts. See text accompanying notes 26-66 infra.
The Finality Rule and the policy underlying it have given rise to a strong policy
of deference to arbitration awards in labor grievance cases. See note 10 infra.
5 In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, the Court reviewed a summary judgment for
the company. The Sixth Circuit had already found sufficient evidence of bad faith to
raise a question of fact as to the union's breach of its duty of fair representation. That
question was not before the Hines Court. See note 86 infra. The Supreme Court de-
cided only that summary judgment for the company was improper when the duty of
fair representation question remained to be litigated. See text accompanying notes 16-
21 infra.
I The Hines Court's discussion of the duty of fair representation may have unde-
sirable effects. See text accompanying notes 86-93 infra.
7 E.g., Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 H~Av. L. REv. 601, 605 (1956).
American labor law is principally devoted to establishing procedures to regulate this
system of industrial self-government. See, e.g., Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive
Character of American Labor Laws, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1394, 1397 (1971).
For a description of a typical, five-step grievance procedure, see C. GREGORY,
LABOR AND THE LAW 481-85 (1961).
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established this Finality Rule with its decisions in the Steelworkers
Trilogy? Since those cases were decided, both the courts and the
NLRB have treated decisions reached through grievance mechanisms
with great deference.10
I United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (arbi-
tration award presumptively final); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (agreement to arbitrate presumed to cover issue in dispute in
absence of express exclusion); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960) (merits of grievance irrelevant in consideration of arbitrability).
10 The pattern of judicial deference to grievance mechanisms has continued to the
present day. See, e.g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235
(1970); Local 174, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95
(1962). See also Note, The Ascendency of Labor-Arbitration and the Confusion of
Labor Arbitrators: A Case of Congressional Neglect, 62 Ky. L. REv. 505 (1974) (herein-
after cited as Ascendency of Labor Arbitration).
Recent NLRB decisions also have followed the Finality Rule. See, e.g., Malrite of
Wisc., Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. 241, No. 3, 80 L.R.R.M. 1593 (1972); Collyer Insulated Wire,
192 N.L.R.B. 837, No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971); but see Trinity Trucking &
Materials Corp., 221 N.L.R.B. No. 64, 90 L.R.R.M. 1499 (1975).
The policy justifications for the Finality Rule are substantial. The number of labor
grievances filed each year would overwhelm the courts. Tobias, Individual Employee
Suits For Breach of the Labor Agreement and the Union's Duty of Fair Representation,
5 U. TOL. L. REv. 514, 520 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Tobias]. In addition, public
policy strongly dictates the rapid resolution of conflicts to avoid the rancor of drawn
out and backlogged grievance proceedings. Further, the Trilogy manifested the Court's
belief that the parties to an agreement are capable of establishing procedures for the
resolution of conflicts which arise under their agreement. United Steelworkers v. War-
rior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). See generally Aaron, Judicial
Intervention in Labor Arbitration, 20 STAN. L. REv. 41 (1967); Smith & Jones, The
Impact of the Emerging Federal Law of Grievance Arbitration on Judges, Arbitrators,
and Parties, 52 VA. L. REv. 831 (1966).
Virtually all collective bargaining agreements provide for the arbitration of griev-
ances. Arbitrators are considered to have special knowledge and competence to decide
labor grievances. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582 (1960). But see Ascendency of Labor Arbitration, supra, at 523-32.
The Supreme Court recently indicated that arbitration may not be the panacea
described in the Trilogy opinions. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)
(Finality Rule weakened in racial discrimination cases). But cf. Emporium Capwell
Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975) (mere allegation of racial
discrimination does not justify bypassing the contract grievance procedure); Gateway
Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974) (Trilogy held controlling in mine safety griev-
ance case). See generally Citron, Deferral of Employee Rights to Arbitration: An
Evolving Dichotomy by the Burger Court?, 27 HAST. L. Rav. 369 (1975).
The Finality Rule generally remains strong. For most grievants, the arbitration
process is the court of last resort. Flynn & Higgins, Fair Representation: A Survey of
the Contemporary Framework and a Proposed Change in the Duty Owed to the
Employee, 8 SUFF. U.L. REv. 1096, 1118-20 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Flynn & Hig-
gins]. Thus, the duty of fair representation is fundamentally important to grievants.
See text accompanying notes 100-108 infra.
FAIR REPRESENTATION
The strength of this policy of deferral gives rise to a potential
conflict between the Finality Rule and the rights of individual em-
ployees. Grievance mechanisms are established and administered by
the parties to the collective bargaining agreement," employers and
unions. Under the National Labor Relations Act, 2 a union is the
exclusive bargaining agent for its bargaining unit, " and each em-
ployee depends upon the union for adequate representation. Thus,
the Finality Rule significantly impedes an employee seeking to over-
turn an arbitration award on the grounds that his union failed to
represent him properly. 4 The Supreme Court, recognizing the danger
to individual rights inherent in the union's status as exclusive bar-
gaining agent, has imposed upon unions a duty to represent all em-
ployees fairly. 5 These two fundamental policy aims-finality and fair
representation-are a source of recurring conflict in the labor law
area. While the Finality Rule is necessary to encourage internal set-
tlement of grievances, its effect must be balanced with the duty of
fair representation to protect the rights of individual union members.
The Supreme Court recently considered these conflicting policies
and doctrines in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight. 6 In Hines, two em-
ployees sought to overturn an adverse arbitration award on their
" Congressional labor legislation has been advanced by either pro-union or pro-
management lobbies. As a result, national labor policy, set forth in the labor statutes,
29 U.S.C. §151 et seq. (1970), deals mostly with the rights of unions and employers as
parties to collective bargaining agreements, rather than with the rights of individual
employees to enforce labor agreements. Tobias, supra note 10, at 521.
2, National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §151 et seq. (1970).
" 29 U.S.C. §159(a) (1970).
" Employee actions against employers for breach of the collective bargaining
agreement are brought under §301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §185(a) (1970)
(district courts have jurisdiction to hear suits for the enforcement of collective bargain-
ing agreements). The section refers only to suits by employers and labor organizations,
and contains no mention of suits by individual employees. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has expressly affirmed the right of an individual employee to sue under §301(a).
Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
An employee suing under §301(a) to overturn an arbitration award faces more
substantial obstacles than merely the lack of an express statutory authorization. The
Finality Rule is one. Others include the superior resources of the union and the com-
pany, and the judicial predisposition to favor "establishment" parties in the action.
See generally Flynn v. Higgins, supra note 10 at 1140-55. In addition, exhaustion
requirements may force an employee to pursue his grievance through both contract
grievance procedures and intra-union grievance proceedings before he is allowed to use
his §301(a) remedy. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 370 U.S. 650 (1965). See
generally Simpson & Berwick, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures and the Individual
Employee, 51 TFx. L. REv. 1179 (1973).
' See text accompanying notes 26-30 infra.
" 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
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wrongful discharge grievance. The employees claimed that the dis-
charge was improper and that the alleged breach of the union's duty
of fair representation in preparing and presenting their case to the
arbitration committee 7 was sufficient ground for vacating the arbi-
tration award. '8 In reversing summary judgment for the employer, the
Supreme Court held that a breach of the duty of fair representation
prevents the employer from relying upon the finality of the arbitra-
tion award.'9 The Court remanded the case for trial on the fair repre-
sentation question.
2 0
The essence of the Court's opinion in Hines was that if a fair
representation breach is shown, the employee has demonstrated that
the arbitration proceeding was ineffective. 2' The Court rejected the
company's argument that it was entitled to rely on the finality of the
award because of its good faith reliance upon the contract grievance
procedure. 22 The company, the Court noted, had "played its part" in
,1 Joint area committees often are utilized in grievance resolution mechanisms in
the trucking industry. These committees consist of an equal number of management
and union representatives. The process by which the committees resolve grievances has
been held to constitute arbitration for the purpose of the Finality Rule. See, e.g., Keane
v. Eastern Freightways, 92 L.R.R.M. 3082 (D.N.J. May 5, 1976). See generally Tobias,
supra note 10, at 540-43.
' 424 U.S. at 554 (1976).
Id. at 567. The duty of fair representation had been recognized as an exception
to the Finality Rule by several courts of appeals prior to the Hines decision. See cases
cited at Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 571-72 n.11 (1976). In addition
to a breach of the duty of fair representation, recognized exceptions to the Finality
Rule include fraud, dishonesty or demonstrated bias on the part of the arbitrator and
conspiracy between the union and the employer. See cases cited at Tobias, supra note
10, at 535-37 nn.64-71.
2o 424 U.S. at 572.
21 Id. at 571.
2 Justice Rehnquist in dissent emphasized the company's good faith reliance
upon the contract grievance procedure and the need to uphold the finality of that
procedure where binding arbitration had occurred. Id. at 574-75 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting). Justice Rehnquist argued that it was improper to create an exception to the
Finality Rule affecting the company because of the union's breach of duty. He analog-
ized the Hines rule to one allowing a party to relitigate a claim on the grounds that
his counsel had been ineffective. Id. at 575.
The "union as counsel" analogy is flawed, however. The individual employee is
virtually compelled to allow the union to represent him in a grievance, while compul-
sion is not present in the normal process of choosing private counsel. Further, the
union, standing in this "compulsory counsel" position, bears no risk for its conduct
unless the employee can meet the high burden of proof associated with the duty of fair
representation. The strictures of conventional malpractice liability which encourage a
conventional attorney to perform at a high level are not applicable to a union repre-
senting an employee at a grievance proceeding. See text accompanying notes 58-70
infra.
FAIR REPRESENTATION
precipitating the dispute by allegedly discharging the plaintiffs in
violation of the collective bargaining agreement. 3 If a fair representa-
tion breach could be shown, thereby nullifying the arbitration award,
summary judgment for the company would have the effect of denying
the plaintiffs a hearing on their grievance." Finding such a result
improper, the Court chose to establish an exception to the Finality
Rule. 25 Demonstrating a breach of the duty of fair representation is
thus a condition precedent to the Finality Rule exception set forth in
Hines. However, since imposing the duty, the Court has had great
difficulty defining a proper standard for fair representation.
The duty of fair representation originated in Steele v. Louisville
& Nashville Railroad.6 In Steele, the employer and union entered
into an agreement to phase out black union members as firemen.
Black firemen challenged the arrangement, alleging discrimination. 27
Holding in favor of the employees, the Court imposed a dual obliga-
tion upon the union: to represent the best interests of the member-
ship as a whole,2 and to represent the individual employees in the
bargaining unit fairly, impartially, and without hostile discrimina-
tion.2 9 The Court, however, asserted little more than generalities as
424 U.S. at 569.
21 Id. at 571-72. The plaintiff would still have his damage claim against the union
for a fair representation breach but would have no claim against the company for
wrongful discharge and no claim for reinstatement.
2 In using the duty of fair representation to establish an exception to a general
rule which favors arbitration of grievances, the Hines result is analogous to the holding
in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (fair representation breach removes exhaustion
requirement). The Court has thus consistently conditioned any direct employee action
against the company in grievance matters upon a showing of a breach of the union's
duty of fair representation.
21 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
2 Id. at 195-96.
2 The duty of fair representation stems from the union's status as exclusive bar-
gaining agent for all employees. See text accompanying notes 12-15 supra. A union not
the exclusive agent operates under no duty of fair representation. See Fowks, The Duty
of Fair Representation: Arbitrary or Perfunctory Handling of Employee Grievances, 15
WASHBURN L.J. 1, 6 (1976). In addition, a union that has a recognized majority in an
appropriate bargaining unit and is therefore the exclusive bargaining agent for that
unit has a duty to represent fairly non-members as well as members. See Richardson
v. Communications Workers of America, 443 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 818 (1973).
21 323 U.S. at 204. In addition to its language prohibiting hostile discrimination,
the Steele court also provided a constitutional basis for its holding. This language
would have incorporated traditional equal protection analysis into the duty of fair
representation, thus providing a more settled standard for fair representation. The
Court reasoned that because the union derives its exclusive bargaining power from the
National Labor Relations Act, it is subject to the same constitutional limitations as
1977]
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the standard for the duty of fair representation." Subsequent deci-
sions have limited the broad outlines of the duty of fair representa-
tion.
The first major development in this narrowing process was the
establishment of the requirement of no "hostile discrimination" 31 as
the basis of the duty of fair representation. 3 The Supreme Court
focused upon the search for hostile discrimination in challenged
union conduct in its next major consideration of the duty, Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffman. 3 3 The Court, while acknowledging Steele, 3 based its
holding upon the "wide range of reasonableness" allowed to the union
as exclusive bargaining representative and the failure of the plaintiff
to prove hostile discrimination .3 Following Huffman, the mere fact
of discrimination would not constitute a breach. Rather, some antip-
athy by the union toward the plaintiff would be required.3 6 As a
result, duty of fair representation cases following Huffman consis-
tently permitted the union greater latitude within the confines of the
duty.
37
Congress. 323 U.S. at 198-99. However, the equal protection aspect of Steele has played
no significant role in the subsequent development of the duty of fair representation.
Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEx. L. REv. 1119,
1144-47 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Clark].
11 323 U.S. at 197.
11 Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944). Although Steele was
decided under the Railway Labor Act, the Supreme Court has applied the duty of fair
representation to those industries covered by the National Labor Relations Act. Syres
v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248
(1944).
32 In duty of fair representation cases subsequent to Steele, the Court attempted
to ascertain whether hostile discrimination on the part of the union was present. See,
e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
- 345 U.S. 330, 332 (1953). The plaintiff in Huffman claimed that the union had
breached its duty of fair representation by entering into a collective bargaining agree-
ment which gave some employees seniority credit for pre-employment military service.
3, 345 U.S. at 337.
1 The Court stated that the "mere existence" of a collective bargaining agreement
that affects different union members in different ways does not render it invalid unless
there is a showing that the agreement was motivated by union hostility toward the
adversely affected members. 345 U.S. at 338.
"' Varied union conduct has been disallowed under the Steele rubric of "hostile
discrimination." See Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F.2d 191
(4th Cir. 1963) (duty of fair representation invoked to prohibit union agreement to
transfers which entailed loss of seniority solely to discriminate against disfavored group
of employees); Cunningham v. Erie R.R., 266 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1959) (union action
motivated by personal animosity is a fair representation breach).
" The Second Circuit has taken the most extreme position by holding that recov-
FAIR REPRESENTATION
The Supreme Court continued the development of the standard
of hostile discrimination in Humphrey v. Moore. 8 The plaintiff in
Humphrey charged that the union had breached its duty of fair repre-
sentation by taking sides in the arbitration of a seniority dispute. The
Court rejected this claim and held that the duty of fair representation
did not compel union neutrality, which would harm the collective
bargaining process by unduly limiting the union's discretion. 9 The
Court based its holding upon the plaintiff's failure to show any hostile
motivation for the union's action."
The refining of the standard for the duty of fair representation
from Steele through Huffman and Humphrey reflected the disparate
policy aims and interests which are bound up in the duty. Strong
unions are viewed as necessary to maintain an effective system of
collective bargaining and industrial self-government." This necessity
dictates that some limits be placed on the duty of fair representation.
Strong individual interests, however, are also present in the relation-
ship between unions and their members. Those interests may be
affected by the actions of the union as the exclusive bargaining agent
in contract negotiations and grievance procedures. Because the union
derives this power from the consent of a majority of the workers in
the bargaining unit, the relation between a union and its members
has attributes of a fiduciary relation.2 However, countervailing inter-
ery for a breach of the duty of fair representation may be granted only if the plaintiff
shows that the union's conduct was motivated by "[s]omething akin to factual mal-
ice. .. ." Cunningham v. Erie R.R., 266 F.2d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 1959).
ZR 375 U.S. 335 (1964). Humphrey involved a seniority dispute growing out of the
merger of two truck lines. The dispute concerned how the seniority rights of the drivers
of the line being taken over would be calculated in the new combined group of drivers.
See generally Comment, Post-Vaca Standards of the Union's Duty of Fair Representa-
tion: Consolidating Bargaining Units, 19 VILL. L. REv. 885 (1974).
11 375 U.S. at 349-50. Humphrey thus extended the Huffman "wide range of
reasonableness" language to a grievance situation where the union's action as exclusive
bargaining agent adversely affected a specific group of employees identifiable in ad-
vance.
375 U.S. at 351.
The achievement of the goal of industrial self-government requires that unions
have the same bargaining power as management. Thus, unions must be vested with
some discretion during both contract negotiation and contract administration. With-
out such discretion and capacity to exercise independent judgment, the union would
have little bargaining power. See Note, Individual Control Over Personal Grievances
Under Vaca v. Sipes, 77 YALE L.J. 559, 564-72 (1967).
42 See, e.g., Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868, 871 (3d Cir. 1970);
Deboles v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 1274, 1287 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See
generally Cox, Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 8 LAB.
L.J. 850, 853-54 (1957); Rosen, Fair Representation, Contract Breach and Fiduciary
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ests present in the duty of fair representation have prevented the
courts from applying traditional fiduciary standards to the employee-
union relation. 3
The next major assessment of the duty of fair representation oc-
cured in Vaca v. Sipes." In Vaca, the Supreme Court analyzed the
conflicting interests involved in the relation between the union and
its members and established a limited fair representation standard,
solicitous of union interests.4 5 Vaca involved an employee's claim that
he had been wrongfully discharged and that the union's failure to
process his grievance through arbitration constituted a breach of its
duty of fair representation. The union had investigated the claim
and processed the grievance through four of the five steps of the
grievance procedure before concluding that arbitration would be
fruitless.47 The plaintiff, however, rejected a proffered settlement and
sued the union 5 The Vaca Court rejected the plaintiff's claim, find-
ing no breach of the duty of fair representation. 9 The Court held that
Obligations: Unions, Union Officials and the Worker in Collective Bargaining, 15
HAsT. L.J. 391, 396 (1964). For a discussion of the fiduciary standards applicable in
the fair representation area, see Flynn & Higgins, supra note 10, at 1148-51.
, See text accompanying notes 54-66 infra.
386 U.S. 171 (1967).
,' See text accompanying notes 67-70 infra.
" 386 U.S. at 173. The plaintiff in Vaca was discharged for health reasons. The
union agreed to abide by the decision of a company-approved doctor who pronounced
the plaintiff unfit for work. The plaintiff later produced medical testimony that he was
fit for work.
, 386 U.S. at 175-76.
Id. at 173. The plaintiff in Vaca brought suit under §301(a) of the Taft-Hartley
Act, 29 U.S.C. §185(a) (1970).
" 386 U.S. at 194-95. Additionally, the Court rejected defendant's contention that
the doctrine of labor law preemption operated to place the case within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NLRB. Id. at 188.
The doctrine of labor law preemption generally applies when the challenged activ-
ity is arguably governed by the NLRA's unfair labor practice provisions. Such activi-
ties are subject to federal regulation and are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NLRB. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). The NLRB
has held that a breach of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice.
Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, No. 7, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962). Nevertheless,
in Vaca and Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 299
(1971), the Court held that the duty of fair representation represented a limited excep-
tion to the preemption doctrine and therefore concurrent jurisdiction existed in the
state and federal courts and the NLRB to hear fair representation suits. Most fair
representation suits are brought in the courts rather than to the NLRB because dam-
ages are available from the courts. The only remedies the Board may grant are rein-
statement and back pay. See generally Bryson, A Matter of Wooden Logic: Labor Law
Preemption and Individurl Rights, 51 TEx. L. Ray. 1037 (1973).
FAIR REPRESENTATION
a breach of the duty occurs only when the union's conduct is "arbi-
trary, discriminatory, or in bad faith."5 In addition, the Court ac-
cepted the proposition that a "union may not arbitrarily ignore a
grievance or process it in a perfunctory manner."'"
The standard developed in Vaca for the union's duty of fair repre-
sentation has been difficult to apply.2 The Court's opinion estab-
lished only that the conduct of the union in Vaca was not arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith, but provided no guidance for deter-
mining the content of these labels. Furthermore, the opinion failed
to clarify whether "perfunctory" union conduct would constitute a
breach of the duty of fair representation after Vaca.53
Later decisions have applied three different standards for the duty
of fair representation while citing Vaca as controlling. 4 These stan-
dards can be briefly described as bad faith, 5 arbitrary and perfunc-
tory representation," and negligence. 57 Courts adhering to a bad faith
standard have denied recovery for various forms of union malfeasance
386 U.S. at 190. The analysis of the duty of fair representation in Vaca reflects
the Court's acceptance of the "union control" theory of collective bargaining. 386 U.S.
at 191-92. This theory postulates that effective collective bargaining and contract
administration require strong unions totally in control of their half of the collective
bargaining relationship. See generally Cox, Rights Under a LaborAgreement, 69 HARv.
L. REv. 601 (1956); Lewis, Fair Representation in Grievance Administration: Vaca v.
Sipes, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 81 (1967). But see Blumrosen, Legal Protection For Critical
Job Interests; Union-Management Authority Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 RUTGERS
L. REV. 631 (1959); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and
Arbitration 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 362 (1962).
" 386 U.S. at 191.
Compare Jackson v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 457 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1972) with
Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975). Both cases purportedly
followed Vaca. See text accompanying notes 54-66 infra.
" See note 55 infra (cases applying a bad faith standard); note 56 infra (cases
applying a perfunctory representation standard). See generally Clark, supra note 29,
at 1122-25.
51 Compare Dill v. Greyhound Corp., 435 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1970) (bad faith
standard) with Retana v. Hotel Operators Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1972)
(arbitrary or perfunctory standard) and Zalejko v. RCA, 98 N.J. Super. 76, 236 A.2d
160 (1967) (negligence standard).
-1 See, e.g., Jackson v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 457 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1972);
Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1970); Marietta v. Cities Serv.
Oil Co., 92 L.R.R.M. 2867 (D.N.J. May 20, 1976).
" See, e.g., Beriault v. IL&WU, 501 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1974); Retana v. Hotel
Operators Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1972); DeArroyo v. Sindicato de Trabaja-
dores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
-1 See, e.g., Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975); Griffin
v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972); Ruggirello v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F. Supp. 758
(E.D. Mich. 1976).
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absent an additional specific finding of bad faith or hostility toward
the plaintiff."' The view that a breach of the duty will be found only
upon a showing of "something akin to factual malice"" has been
followed in cases subsequent to Vaca. ° Recent decisions, however,
indicate a trend away from rigid adherence to a bad faith standard.6 '
These cases characteristically have involved summary dismissal of
member claims by union leadership.2 Adopting the "arbitrary and
perfunctory" language from Vaca as their standard for fair represen-
tation, these decisions permitted recovery without requiring the
plaintiff to prove bad faith on the part of the union.13 A third stan-
dard, adopted in very few cases, permits recovery for negligence."
While the standard in these cases has generally been stated as an
1 Balowski v. UAW, 372 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1967). Cf. Sims v. Rex Paper Co., 26
Mich. App. 129, 182 N.W. 2d 90 (1970) (union negligently allowed the time limit for
filing a grievance to pass); Dill v. Greyhound Corp., 435 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1970)
(union's decision not to press plaintiff's grievance found to constitute reckless disre-
gard of employee's rights, but recovery denied because the plaintiff failed to show bad
faith).
Under a bad faith standard, courts have focused upon the union leadership's state
of mind and not the merits of the plaintiff's grievance. Some cases have held that
considering the merits of the grievance in evaluating the union's motive under a bad
faith standard is reversible error. See, e.g., Simburland v. Long Island Ry. Co., 421
F.2d 1219 (2d Cir. 1970).
5' Cunningham v. Erie R.R., 266 F.2d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 1959).
6o Jackson v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 457 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1972); Hiatt v. New
York Cent. R.R., 444 F.2d 1397 (7th Cir. 1971). Both Jackson and Hiatt involved union
action during contract negotiations and thus may be distinguished from cases involv-
ing grievance procedure administration. The courts, however, have not recognized this
distinction. See text accompanying notes 101-104 infra.
4' See, e.g., Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975); Peter-
sen v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972); Retana v. Hotel Operators Local
14, 453 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1972).
"3 In DeArroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970), the union failed even to consider the seniority claims
of the employees plaintiffs. In Retana v. Hotel Operators Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018 (9th
Cir. 1972), Spanish-speaking union members recovered after showing that the union
had totally ignored their needs by failing to provide any liaison or even to explain the
grievance procedure to them.
Cases imposing an arbitrary and perfunctory standard for fair representation
have drawn a distinction between perfunctory representation and mere negligence on
the part of the union. The latter conduct is not, according to these cases, proscribed
by the duty of fair representation. See, e.g., Whitten v. Anchor Motor Freight, 90
L.R.R.M. 2161 (6th Cir. 1975); Nagel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 396 F. Supp.
391, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) ("mere negligence does not establish a breach of the duty of
fair representation"). See generally Tobias, supra note 10, at 524-28.
" See cases cited at note 57 supra.
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arbitrariness test,65 the facts and language in the opinions support the
view that a negligence standard for fair representation was imposed
upon the union.6"
When Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight"7 came before the Supreme
Court, these three standards for the duty of fair representation had
been spawned by Vaca. No court had adequately articulated a stan-
dard balancing the conflicting interests bound up in the duty of fair
representation. 8 The existence of these conflicting standards 9 and
the confusion in the lower courts indicated that Vaca's generalities
did not provide an adequate basis for deciding cases which involved
the duty of fair representation. Although the procedural context of
Hines prevented the Court from establishing a binding standard for
Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 310 (6th Cir. 1975); Griffin v.
UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 184 (4th Cir. 1972). Zalejko v. RCA, 98 N.J. Super. 76, 236 A.2d
160 (1967), is an exception. Faced with facts almost identical to those in Vaca, the New
Jersey court upheld a verdict for the plaintiff, stating that "fair" representation meant
"adequate" representation. The court cited Vaca but made no effort to categorize the
union's conduct as "arbitrary" or "perfunctory." 98 N.J. Super. at 84, 236 A.2d at 164.
The union was liable because its investigation of the plaintiff's fitness to return to work
had led to the wrong conclusion.
" See Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975); Griffin v.
UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972). The plaintiff in Griffin, who was discharged for
fighting with a supervisor, recovered for a breach of the duty of fair representation
occurring when the union took his grievance to that same supervisor. The Griffin court
found that the union's handling of the plaintiff's grievance was "arbitrary" because it
was unreasonable under the circumstances. 469 F.2d at 183-84. Thus, while character-
izing its holding as the imposition of an arbitrariness test, the court utilized the
standard for common law negligence. However, the union's breach of duty in Griffin
was aggravated, and therefore the case will not support a contention that negligent
union conduct will hereafter give rise to a fair representation cause of action.
The Ruzicka case provides a clearer example of employee recovery for a fair repre-
sentation breach where the union's conduct was negligent. By failing to file a timely
notice of intent to proceed with a grievance, the union lost the plaintiff's grievance.
The court held that the plaintiff was not required to show bad faith and that the
union's negligent failure to file was a breach of the duty of fair representation. The
court went to great pains to reconcile Ruzicka with its earlier bad faith standard cases,
see, e.g., Dill v. Greyhound Corp., 435 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1970), which had involved a
reasoned evaluation of the situation by the union and a conscious decision as to how
to proceed. In contrast, the union's procedural negligence in its treatment of Ruzicka's
grievance was termed "inexplicable" and therefore arbitrary and perfunctory within
the meaning of Vaca. 523 F.2d at 310. See also Recent Development, Union's Duty of
Fair Representation Held to be Breached by Negligent Failure to Act on Behalf of
Member, 44 FORD. L. REv. 1061, 1067 (1976).
-7 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
" See text accompanying notes 52-58 supra.
61 See text accompanying notes 52-66 supra.
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the duty of fair representation,70 the facts of the case did present an
opportunity to analyze and perhaps alleviate the problems, inconsis-
tencies, and general lack of clarity which had prevailed in the fair
representation area since Vaca.
The plaintiffs in Hines were discharged for allegedly falsifying
motel receipts, and thus receiving excessive expense reimbursements.
The employees protested their innocence to the union, telling union
officials that the motel clerk was the guilty party. Union officials told
the employees that they had "nothing to worry about,"' but con-
ducted no investigation of the motel clerk, even when the motel man-
ager stated that those claims might well be true. The grievance was
processed through preliminary steps to arbitration. At the arbitration
hearing, the joint arbitration committee for the area7" upheld the
discharges because the union presented no evidence to counter that
put forward by the company. 3 Evidence subsequently surfaced sup-
porting the employees' claims regarding the motel clerk. The employ-
ees filed suit against the company, the local, and the international,74
claiming that the new evidence of the merit of their grievance plus
evidence of the hostility of local union officials toward them 75 justified
a finding of a breach of the duty of fair representation and required
vacating the arbitration award."8 The district court granted summary
judgment for all defendants, holding that insufficient evidence of bad
faith was present to justify overturning an arbitration award in the
face of the Finality Rule.77 Citing the evidence of hostility as a valid
basis for an inference of bad faith, 8 the Sixth Circuit vacated the
o See note 86 infra.
424 U.S. at 557.
7 See note 17 supra.
13 424 U.S. at 557-58.
71 Id. at 558.
" Evidence of hostility between the plaintiffs and the local union leadership in-
cluded a dispute over the appointment of a steward which resulted in one of the
plaintiffs being denounced as a "hillbilly" by the president of the local, and lingering
hostility from a wildcat strike in which the plaintiffs had participated. Id. at 559-60
n.4.
76 Id. at 558.
" Hines v. Local 377, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 84 L.R.R.M. 2649 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
In granting summary judgment for all defendants, the district court held that the
Finality Rule was applicable unless the plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to raise an
inference of bad faith. Id. at 2650.
7K Hines v. Local 377, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 506 F.2d 1153, 1157 (6th Cir. 1974).
Reversing the district court's summary judgment for the local union, the court held
that the plaintiffs' allegations of bad faith handling of their grievance went beyond
conclusory statements and alleged specific facts that, if true, could constitute bad
faith. Id. at 1157.
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summary judgment for the local union and remanded that claim for
trial.79 The court of appeals held that the Finality Rule barred recon-
sideration of the employees' grievance against the company, given the
total lack of evidence of misconduct by the company or conspiracy
between the company and the union.80 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider only the holding as to the company.8
The question before the Supreme Court in Hines was the validity
of the company's claim that the Finality Rule barred relitigation of
the employees' grievance after an adverse arbitration award.2 In re-
versing the Sixth Circuit's decision, the Court held that if an em-
ployee proves a breach of the duty of fair representation which seri-
ously undermines the integrity of the arbitral process, the company
may not rely upon the Finality Rule. This result seems unassailable
based upon the facts of this case.' The Hines decision gives force to
the fair representation breach exception to the Finality Rule. Thus,
Hines is apparently a decision which increases the protection given
to the rights of individual union members. However, the Court's dis-
cussion of the duty of fair representation reduces the likelihood that
the rights of individual employees will be aided by this exception to
the Finality Rule."
1' Id. The court upheld the summary judgment for the international union, citing
insufficient evidence from which bad faith could be inferred. Id.
Id. at 1157, 1158.
424 U.S. at 561.
Id. at 560-61.
I3 d. at 567.
The union, after telling the plaintiffs they had "nothing to worry about," did
nothing to further the plaintiffs' case. It then sat mute at the arbitration hearing after
the company presented the evidence that resulted in the discharges being upheld. Id.
at 557-58.
The result in Hines was foreshadowed by decisions of several courts of appeals.
See, e.g., Margetta v. Pam Pam Corp., 501 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff entitled
to attempt to prove fair representation breach where facts permitted inference that
union's conduct has deprived plaintiff of right to a "fair hearing" on grievance); Local
13, Longshoremen v. Pacific Maritime Assoc., 441 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir. 1971) (evidence
permitted inference that hostility motivated union's decision to "swap" on plaintiffs'
grievance, summary judgment for union vacated). See also cases cited at 424 U.S. 554,
571-72 n.11. See generally Clark, supra note 29, at 1168-69; Flynn & Higgins, supra
note 10, at 1018-21; Tobias, supra note 10, at 537-39.
0 See text accompanying notes 88-92 infra. The discussion of the fair representa-
tion standard was not necessary to reach the result in Hines. The Court could have
rejected the company's arguments and set up the breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion as an express exception to the Finality Rule without any discussion of what
constitutes a breach of the duty. Alternatively, the Court might have analyzed the
duty of fair representation and clarified the Vaca standard.
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The Hines opinion provided a brief discussion of the duty of fair
representation which failed to clarify the Vaca standards.8 Asserting
that a breach of the duty of fair representation "involves more than
. . . errors in judgment by the union",87 the Court went on to state
that erroneous arbitration decisions cannot be allowed to stand when
the union's representation of the employee has been "dishonest, in
bad faith, or discriminatory." 8 This series of adjectives simply reiter-
ated the Vaca fair representation standard with one notable excep-
tion-Hines substituted "dishonest" for "arbitrary."8 If this change
is taken as a change in the fair representation standard, the range of
union conduct which breaches the duty will be narrowed greatly.
" No fair representation claim was actually before the Court. The plaintiffs' claim
against the local union had been remanded to the lower courts. The only question
facing the Supreme Court was what impact a judgment for the plaintiff against the
union would have on the company's attempt to rely upon the finality of the arbitration
award. The Court could have answered this question without any mention of the
standard of fair representation to be applied by the lower court.
The Court's discussion of the duty of fair representation in Hines was reminiscent
of its discussion of the duty in dicta in Amalgamated Assoc. of St. Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971). The principal issue in Lockridge was whether fair
representation claims were within the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor
practice claims. See note 49 supra. The Supreme Court held that fair representation
claims were not preempted by the NLRB and that the federal courts thus had jurisdic-
tion to hear these claims. The Court, in attempting to allay fears that the duty of fair
representation exception to the doctrine of labor law preemption would "swallow up"
the NLRB's jurisdiction over union unfair labor practices, stated that duty of fair
representation cases would not conflict with unfair labor practice cases because the
former require a showing of "intentional, severe union discrimination." 403 U.S. at 301.
The Court then stated that if the preemption doctrine was "not to be swallowed up,
the . . . distinction . . . between honest, mistaken conduct, on the one hand, and
deliberate and severely hostile and irrational treatment, on the other, needs to be
strictly maintained." 403 U.S. at 301. If these adjectives were to be adopted as the
standard for fair representation, recovery for a breach of the duty would be unlikely.
Some courts have viewed the Lockridge dicta as narrowing Vaca. See, e.g., Buz-
zard v. Machinists Local 1040, 480 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1973); Papillon v. Hughes Printing
Co., 413 F.Supp. 1313 (M.D. Pa. 1976). Generally, however, courts have continued to
adhere to Vaca as the fair representation standard and have viewed the Lockridge dicta
as a restatement of pre-existing fair representation law, and not as a limitation of Vaca.
See Clark, supra note 29, at 1126.
" 424 U.S. at 570-71.
" Id. at 571.
" Compare Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967) with Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976).
" The Court's substitution of "dishonest" for "arbitrary" in the fair representa-
tion standard implies that the plaintiff must demonstrate an element of intent if he is
to recover. Intent is always difficult to prove, a fact illustrated by the rarity of actions
founded upon intentional torts as compared with those founded upon negligence. Fur-
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Such a narrowed fair representation standard necessarily reduces the
protection afforded individual rights by the duty." Therefore, the
Supreme Court's discussion of the duty of fair representation in Hines
leaves that area of the law unclear while opening the way for a stan-
dard less protective of individual rights. Those aspects of Vaca which
have proved troublesome and have led to the development of conflict-
ing standards9 2 were not clarified and may well be further confused
by the Court's opinion in Hines.1
3
thermore, by impliedly requiring the plaintiff to prove the subjective intent of the
union to harm him, the Court lent support to the view that bad faith was an essential
element of unfair representation. See text accompanying notes 53-60 supra.
"1 The Vaca standard was a holding by the Court, while the discussion of the duty
of fair representation in Hines is only dictum. Thus, the substitution of dishonest for
arbitrary need not have the effect of lowering the fair representation standard. The
Court, however, has not made an authoritative statement on the duty since Vaca and
both references to the duty in dicta in subsequent cases have stated lower standards
for union conduct than did Vaca. See note 86 supra. Thus, while the lower courts have
been moving toward a more protective view of the duty of fair representation, see text
accompanying notes 61-63 supra, the Supreme Court's comments support the view
that the union's bad faith or hostility is a prerequisite for recovery.
The Court's statement that the Finality Rule does not apply when the employee
can prove a breach of the duty of fair representation that "seriously undermines the
integrity of the arbitral process . .," 424 U.S. at 567 raises additional questions. The
Court stated that in cases where an employee seeks to overturn an arbitration award,
the focus must be upon whether a substantial reason exists to believe that the union's
conduct "contributed to an erroneous outcome of the arbitration proceedings." Id. at
568. It is unclear whether this language places an additional requirement upon the
plaintiff analogous to showing proximate cause. Arguably, any breach of the duty of
fair representation necessarily undermines the arbitral process and contributes to an
erroneous result, thus entitling the employee under Hines to relitigate his grievance
against the company. Only two courts have considered this aspect of Hines. Hardee v.
North Carolina Allstate Serv., Inc., 537 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1976); Lewis v. Greyhound
Lines-East, 411 F. Supp. 368 (D.D.C. 1976). Both of these cases state the Hines stan-
dard as two separate requirements: first, the plaintiff must prove a breach of the duty;
second, he must prove that breach undermined the arbitral process. However, the
courts in both cases held that the plaintiff had failed to show a breach of the duty of
fair representation. The opinions did not reach the question of whether some breaches
of the duty of fair representation might fail to undermine the arbitral process, thereby
preventing the employee from relying upon the Hines exception to the Finality Rule.
Whether the employee must establish a link analogous to proximate cause between the
union's breach of duty and the erroneous arbitration award in order to rely on the Hines
exception remains uncertain.
The discussion of fair representation in Hines is made more threatening to the
interests of individual union members by the presence of similar language in
Lockridge, the court's only other post-Vaca discussion of the duty. See note 86 supra.
,2 See text accompanying notes 54-66 supra.
"3 No cases reported subsequent to Hines have relied upon the Court's opinion as
authority for a standard of fair representation. However, one court did rely heavily on
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The future impact of Hines depends upon the continued evolution
of the standard for the union's duty of fair representation. 4 The duty
as it is discussed in Hines reflects conditions which no longer exist in
the labor relations area. Standards that are solicitous of union inter-
ests and evince a concern that the ability of unions to bargain from
a position of strength be carefully safeguarded misconceive the nature
of the modern union-management relationship. Such standards re-
flect concerns applicable to the labor movement in its infancy but no
longer accurate.
The labor movement today is mature, and unions typically deal
with management from a position of great strength. 6 In addition, the
complete identity of interest which characterized the relationship
between the union and its members during the formative years of the
labor movement no longer exists. 7 Thus, the individual interests
present in the relation between unions and their members should now
be given greater protection. The imposition of a fair representation
standard giving greater protection to those individual interests would
not significantly threaten the collective bargaining process.
Grievance cases particularly require increased protection of indi-
vidual rights. The balance of individual and collective interests in-
the very similar Lockridge dicta, see note 86 supra, in a fair representation case after
the Hines decision. Papillon v. Hughes Printing Co., 413 F. Supp. 1313 (M.D. Pa.
1976).
1, Proof of a breach of the duty of fair representation is a condition precedent to
making use of the Hines exception to the Finality Rule. 424 U.S. at 570-71.
91 H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 186-90 (1968); Schatzki,
Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Individual Workers:
Should Exclusivity Be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 897, 902-08 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Schatzki]; Tobias, supra note 10, at 520-23. The principal standards of fair
representation are bad faith and perfunctory representation. See text accompanying
notes 54-63 supra. Both of these standards are founded upon the "union control"
theory of collective bargaining recognized by the Court in Vaca. See note 50 supra.
These standards require more severe union misfeasance than simple negligence to
support union member recovery for a breach of the duty of fair representation. See text
accompanying notes 54-66 supra.
" See C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw 504-30 (1961); Blumrosen, Group Interests
in Labor Law, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 432, 480-84 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Blumrosen].
'" See Blumrosen, supra note 96, at 452-60; Schatzki, supra note 95, at 901-10;
Note, Fair Representation Suits and Breach of Contract in Section 301 Employee-
Union Suits: Who's Watching the Back Door?, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 714, 723-25 (1974).
U See, e.g., Blumrosen, supra note 96 at 481-83; Clark, supra note 29, at 1177-78;
Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Bargaining Agreements and Arbitration, 37
N.Y UL. REV. 362, 410 (1962); Tobias, supra note 10, at 559-61.
11 See, e.g., Flynn & Higgins, supra note 10, at 1115-52; Schatzki, supra note 95,
at 903-04; Tobias, supra note 10, at 559-61.
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volved in the duty of fair representation is different in grievance
administration than in contract negotiations. In contract negotia-
tions, the union represents the bargaining unit as a whole, ' and the
collective interest in allowing the union to maintain its discretion to
serve the best interests of the bargaining unit is strong.'0 ' In contrast,
grievance cases involve the individual interests of an identifiable
employee.0 " Whether a union should be permitted to exercise the
same discretion under those circumstances as it does in contract
negotiations is questionable.' 3 Failure to recognize this distinction' 4
has resulted in an unduly rigid fair representation standard. This
standard fails to provide adequate protection for individual rights in
the situation where those rights are most in jeopardy. The Court's
discussion of the duty of fair representation in Hines gave no indica-
tion that the Court recognized the necessity for distinguishing be-
tween fair representation in contract negotiations and fair representa-
tion in grievance administration.' 5
Likewise, within the broad classification of grievance proceedings,
claims of wrongful discharge require special consideration. 1  Dis-
charge is the "capital punishment of the industrial world."' 17 In addi-
tion, the temptation for the union to expend less than the maximum
11 Negotiated contract provisions may affect different members different ways,
but they affect a class of similarly situated workers, not a particular individual. See
Comment, Individual Control Over Personal Grievances Under Vaca v. Sipes, 77 YALE
L.J. 559, 562-63 (1968).
" Recognition of the need for broad union discretion during contract negotiations
was the essence of the Supreme Court's holding in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330 (1953); see text accompanying notes 33-35 supra. Huffman established that
a union must be allowed a "wide range of reasonableness" in which to negotiate
agreements with employers. However, the Huffman standard has been applied to
grievance cases as well. See, e.g., Tedford v. Peabody Coal Co., 533 F.2d 952 (5th Cir.
1976) (union accorded broad discretion in contract negotiations; Marietta v. Cities
Serv. Co., 92 L.R.R.M. 2867 (D.N.J. May 20, 1976) (Huffman "wide range of reasona-
bleness" language relied upon in grievance cases); see generally Schatzki, supra note
95, at 898-904.
I" See Clark, supra note 29, at 1156-77.
103 Id.
101 See note 101 supra (cases applying Huffman "wide range of reasonableness"
test to union conduct in grievance proceedings).
"0 The Hines court began its discussion of the duty of fair representation by
quoting the Huffman "wide range of reasonableness" test. 424 U.S. at 563-64.
I" Lowe v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 705, 389 Mich. 123, 205 N.W.2d
167, 170 (1973). See Tobias, A Plea for the Wrongfully Discharged Employee Aban-
doned by His Union, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 55, 57 (1972).
10' Tobias, A Plea for the Wrongfully Discharged Employee Abandoned by His
Union, 41 U. CIN. L. Rzv. 55, 57-58 (1972).
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effort possible on the grievance of a member unpopular with local
leadership is particularly strong in discharge cases."' Therefore, a fair
representation standard must reflect the gravity of a wrongful dis-
charge grievance.
A sound standard of fair representation would reflect the complex-
ities involved in evaluating the union's duty in various circumstan-
ces. Such a standard would impose fiduciary obligations consistent
with the nature of the relationship between modem unions and their
members." 9 Furthermore, the primacy of individual interests in
grievance cases would be recognized. A requirement of "pure reasona-
bleness"110 for union conduct thus is more consistent with the fidu-
ciary nature of the union-member relation and the magnitude of
individual interests involved in grievance cases than the standards
now normally imposed."' In particular, discharge cases merit special
consideration and a more exacting standard of fair representation."'
The test for common law negligence, reasonable care under the
I" A discharge case offers local union leadership the opportunity to get rid of a
dissident member by expending less than a maximum effort on his grievance, thereby
increasing the likelihood that his discharge will be upheld. Furthermore, any discharge
case presents little risk of future dissatisfaction with local union leadership stemming
from poor representation. If a discharge is upheld, the losing grievant is no longer a
voting union member with a practical avenue to express his dissatisfaction. In contrast,
members dissatisfied with the union's handling of a seniority grievance retain their
positions and thus a means of exerting leverage against the local leadership.
The facts of Hines provides a possible illustration. Hines involved union members
out of favor with local leadership. The union's handling of the plaintiffs' grievance
could support an inference that the local leadership was seeking to rid themselves of
the plaintiffs. See note 84 supra.
"I Deboles v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 1274 (E.D. Pa. 1972), where
the court stated, "[t]he union's conduct must conform to the high standard de-
manded of any fiduciary relationship." Id. at 1287. Nevertheless, the court applied the
Vaca standard which recognizes union liability only for arbitrary, discriminatory or
bad faith conduct-hardly the standard demanded of a typical fiduciary. See note 42
supra. See generally Cox, Individual Enforcement of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, 8 LAB. L.J. 850, 853-54 (1957).
"0 The court in Lowe v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, Local 705, 389 Mich. 123,
205 N.W.2d 167 (1973), upheld an instruction which stated the fair representation
standard as one of "pure reasonableness." 389 Mich. at 147, 205 N.W.2d at 178. The
question in Lowe was whether the union acted in a manner that was reasonable and
prudent under the circumstances in refusing to take the plaintiff's grievance to arbitra-
tion. 389 Mich. at 149, 205 N.W.2d at 178. See also Recent Decisions, Fair Representa-
tion-Discharge Cases Demand a High Degree of Care, 51 J. URo. LAW 575 (1974).
" Under present standards, the vast majority of fair representation claims are
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Flynn &
Higgins, supra note 10, at 1150-51 n.286.
112 See text accompanying notes 106-109 supra.
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circumstances, 3 would provide the needed combination of flexibility
and increased protection. Courts properly applying a negligence stan-
dard would consider the varying balance of interests involved in fair
representation in different contexts and evaluate union responsibility
accordingly." 4 Phrasing the union's duty as one of reasonable care
under the circumstances would emphasize the fiduciary aspects of
the union's role better than the statements of the duty now em-
ployed."1
5
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight offered the Supreme Court an
opportunity to undertake a reasoned analysis of the duty of fair repre-
sentation and advance an improved standard. However, the Court's
discussion of fair representation was unilluminating and perhaps
even potentially harmful to the interests of individual employees.",
Hines was a discharge case involving unpopular union members."1
7
The union did very little to increase the likelihood of a favorable
arbitration award."' The Court should have recognized the special
nature of discharge cases"9 and the different balance of interests in-
volved in grievance proceedings compared with contract negotia-
tions. 20 Instead, the Court opened its discussion of fair representation
with a citation to the "wide range of reasonableness" language from
Hufjman'"' and gave no indication that it recognized the dubious
applicability of this standard to a grievance proceeding.' The
Court's discussion of the proper standard for fair representation is
narrower and equally as vague as the unsatisfactory Vaca adjec-
tives. ,
After Hines, an employee who can show a breach of the duty of
fair representation will be entitled to litigate the merits of his griev-
ance in court despite an adverse arbitration award. Therefore, Hines
seems to have the effect of increasing the protection given to the
individual rights of union members. However, the Hines Court pro-
vided an inadequate discussion of the duty of fair representation
which may reduce the protection given to the rights of individual
,3 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTs ch. 5 (4th Ed. 1971).
2 See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
,5 See text accompanying notes 58-63 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 86-93 supra.
"1 424 U.S. at 559-60 n.4.
U See text accompanying notes 71-76 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 106-108 supra.
1' See text accompanying notes 100-105 supra.
21 424 U.S. at 563-64. See note 101 supra.
'l See text accompanying notes 100-105 supra.
12 See text accompanying notes 86-93 supra.
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employees. Modem unions are sufficiently well established to allow
the imposition of a negligence standard for fair representation consis-
tent with the fiduciary obligations present in the relation between a
union and its members.'24 Such a standard is particularly necessary
in grievance proceedings because of the primacy of individual inter-
ests, as opposed to collective interests, in grievance administration.
Courts should impose the highest standard of fair representation in
discharge grievance proceedings. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight pro-
vided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to examine and discuss
this issue; however, the Court failed to take full advantage of this
opportunity.
E. TowNEs DUNCAN
121 See text accompanying notes 96-99 supra.
